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D URING THE LAST DECADE, THERE HAS BEEN RE-markable growth in the number of health care institutions with 
ethics committees. These are multidisciplinary committees 
established to address ethical dilemmas in patient care. The committees 
often deal with issues regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from patients who lack decision-making capacity 
(Cranford and Doudera 1984). Although the number of hospitals with 
such committees was estimated to be less than 100 in the early 1980s 
(Youngner et al. 1984), by 1985, according to a survey by the American 
Hospital Association {1985), more than 60 percent of American hospitals 
had their own ethics committee. There are no more recent national esti-
mates of the number of hospitals that have established these commit-
tees, but there is reason to believe the numbers have grown in the last 
eight years. 
The motivation for establishing these committees has been mainly in-
ternal: nurses, social workers, and physicians initiated the committees as 
a better way to deal with cases that involved the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment. However, a series of external events 
undoubtedly influenced their formation as well. Among them was the 
1976 New Jersey court case of Karen Ann Quinlan, 1 a young woman 
1 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, cen. denied 429 U.S. 922 (N.J. 1976). 
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who had been in a persistent vegetative state for several years. At issue in 
the case was whether Karen's father had the legal right to authorize her 
removal from a ventilator. In its opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
quoted an article by Dr. Karen Teel, which suggested that the way to 
improve medical decision making was for each hospital to establish an 
"ethics committee composed of physicians, social workers, attorneys, and 
theologians . . . which [would serve 1 to review the individual circum-
stances of ethical dilemma[ s 1 and which [would provide 1 much in the 
way of assistance and safeguards for patients and their medical care-
takers." 2 
The value of ethics committees received increased attention in 1983, 
when the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research published its re-
port, Deciding to Forego Lifo Sustaining Medical Treatment. The com-
mission concluded that, in order to protect the interests of patients who 
lack decision-making capacity and to ensure their well-being and self-
determination, health care institutions "should explore and evaluate ... 
various administrative arrangements for review and consultation, such as 
'ethics committees' particularly for decisions that have life or death con-
sequences .... " (1983, 5). 
A third external motivating factor for the establishment of these com-
mittees was the promulgation in 1985 by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services of the "Baby Doe" regulations. 3 These reg-
ulations strongly encouraged, but did not mandate, that hospitals caring 
for newborns establish infant care review committees to review cases 
where the withholding of life-sustaining treatment of a newborn was be-
ing considered. 
Since the Quinlan case, a handful of court cases have mentioned the 
positive role that an ethics committee can play in dealing with difficult 
medical treatment issues. Probably the strongest endorsement of the com-
mittees came from the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of In re 
To"es. 4 In that case, the court stated that an affirmation by an ethics 
committee of a family's decision to withdraw life support from a patient 
in a persistent vegetative state would eliminate the need for judicial ap-
2 Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doc-
tor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 Baylor L. Rev. 6, 9 (1975). 
3 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1991). 
4 In re To"es, 357 N.W. 2d 332 (Minn. 1984). 
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proval. A similar endorsement came from the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in the case of Nancy Jobes. 5 The court spoke favorably of the role of 
ethics committees in assisting family members and health care providers 
to make decisions about the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from incapacitated patients. 
This wave of enthusiasm for ethics committees also resulted in one 
state (Maryland) mandating their establishment by statute,6 another 
state (New Jersey) mandating the establishment of either an ethics com-
mittee or a prognosis committee by regulation/ a third state (New 
York) considering making them mandatory (New York State Task Force 
on Life and the Law 1992), two states (Maryland and Hawaii)8 immu-
nizing them from liability, and the introduction of a bill into Congress9 
that would have required every hospital in the country to establish such 
a committee. More recently, the Joint Commission on the Accreditation 
of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) has recommended in its accredi-
tation guidelines that hospitals establish a mechanism within the institu-
tion to resolve ethical dilemmas in patient care. 
The fact that some legislatures and courts, and a powerful body like 
JCAHO, appear to have wholeheartedly embraced these committees is 
truly surprising, given the paucity of data on their impact or effective-
ness. These efforts to mandate or encourage the widespread establish-
ment and use of ethics committees seem to ignore some of their risks. 
Levine pointed out: 
Hospital ethics committees, like any institutional arrangement, can be 
used for ill as well as for good. They are in essence a procedural mech-
anism that can aid those faced with difficult ethical decisions; their 
presence does not guarantee that they will be used constructively or 
that the most appropriate decision will be made. (1984, 9) 
More than a decade ago, Youngner et al. (1984) referred to hospital 
ethics committees as "poorly defined, unproven entities." Today, ethics 
committees may be somewhat better defined, but they remain largely 
5 In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). 
6 Maryland Annotated Code. 1990. Health General Article. §§ 19-374. 
7 New Jersey Department of Health. 1990. Regulation and Administration 
Code § 8:436-5.1, Licensure Reform Subchapter. 
8 Hawaii Rev. Stat. §663-1.7 (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
9 S.1766, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
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unproven. In fact, "it has not yet been shown that [healthcare ethics 
committees] actually facilitate either the decision-making process or better 
decisions regarding ethical questions" (Mahowald 1989). 
Since 1983, there have been several hundred articles written on ethics 
committees, but few have set forth a systematic framework for evaluating 
them, and none has done so from a public policy perspective. My goal in 
this anicle is to begin filling that void by imparting a conceptual frame-
work for evaluating ethics committees from a public policy or societal 
perspective; applying available data to the framework; and pointing out 
areas where additional empirical research is necessary. 
Evaluation Efforts to Date 
A number of researchers have collected data that might be used in the 
evaluation of ethics committees. These studies have generally focused on 
structural aspects of ethics committees: for example, the number of 
members on a committee; the composition of the committee by disci-
pline; who has access to the committee; and types of functions that such 
committees perform (see studies by Youngner et al. 1984; Kushner and 
Gibson 1984; Nash, Leinbach, and Fought 1989; Minnesota Ethics 
Committee Network 1990; D'Oronzio, Dunn, and Gregory 1991; Hoff-
mann 1991; and Schienon 1992). Some, however, have gone another 
step and looked at user satisfaction or perceptions of potential users. 
Youngner et al. {1984), for example, assessed patients' attitudes toward 
hospital ethics committees generally. I surveyed approximately 2,000 
physicians, nurses, and social workers at five Maryland hospitals, asking 
whether they had used their hospital's ethics committee, and if so, whether 
they had found it helpful to their decision making (Hoffmann 1991). 
La Puma and coworkers {1988, 1992) examined the satisfaction of physi-
cians who used an ethics consultation service at a university and a com-
munity hospital. 
With a few notable exceptions, writers have not suggested either nor-
mative standards or a systematic framework for evaluating ethics com-
mittees. The few who have attempted to formulate generalizable criteria 
have done so mainly from the perspective of an insider-often an ethics 
committee member or an institutional administrator. Typically, the dis-
cussion has focused on a single committee. For example, Povar {1991) 
examined the validity of two criteria for success of an ethics committee in 
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its roles of policy making and case consultation- institutional acceptance 
and consensus within the ethics committee- and used her own ethics 
committee experience in applying the criteria. Van Allen et al. (1989) 
suggested that the yardstick by which ethics committees should be mea-
sured is their own mission statement. 
Others either have taken a narrow view of what constitutes appropri-
ate measures of success or have not explicitly described the perspective of 
their evaluation. Fletcher (1989), in suggesting standards for evaluating 
ethics consultation, focused exclusively on process issues; for example, 
has the consultant or committee clarified the options, interviewed the 
appropriate parties, reviewed the patient's chart? Tulsky and Lo (1992) 
went a bit farther. In critiquing the 1992 study by LaPuma et al., which 
looked exclusively at physician satisfaction, they suggested that evalua-
tion criteria should include patient and surrogate satisfaction, reactions 
of nurses and house staff, and objective measures for resolving dilem-
mas. This last criterion, however, was not defined. Finally, insightful 
pieces by Lo (1987) and by Griener and Storch (1992) include thoughts 
about criteria for evaluating ethics committees, but they do not attempt 
a comprehensive framework for doing so, nor do they state the perspec-
tive from which the ethics committees should be evaluated. 
The First Stumbling Block: Clarifying the 
Perspective of Evaluation and the Purpose 
of Ethics Committees 
Any evaluation will be based largely on answering the question, Is the 
service or entity being evaluated achieving its purpose or goal? Thus, be-
fore standards or criteria can be established, the entity's purpose must be 
defined. The answer to this question, however, will depend on who is 
being asked and what perspective that person or organization is working 
from. Groups or organizations that may have an interest in evaluating 
ethics committees include committee members, patients, health care pro-
viders, hospitals, insurance companies, state or federal agencies, judges, 
and legislators. Each group will view the purpose of these committees 
differently. Thus, the perspective of any evaluation must be clarified be-
fore embarking on such an effort. 
In this article, I plan to take the perspective of public policy makers: 
legislators and government agency personnel, for example. Given that 
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legislation has been enacted and proposed either to require ethics commit-
tees or to encourage their use, and that a handful of courts have mentioned 
using ethics committees as an alternative to judicial decision making, it 
seems appropriate to ask, How should public policy makers evaluate them? 
Evaluation efforts from a public policy or societal perspective not only 
may assist policy makers in thinking about mandating ethics commit-
tees, but also may help them to decide whether the committees should 
be authorized to substitute for judicial review or be given immunity 
from liability, or whether state or federal programs should fund ethics 
committees or reimburse hospitals for the costs of their consultations. 
Because these policy questions have been raised and are currently under 
consideration in some legislatures and courtrooms, legislators, judges, 
and state and federal agencies should be interested in assessing these 
committees' overall performance. 
This perspective leads to the question, What is the appropriate pur-
pose from which to evaluate ethics committees? Unfortunately, ethics 
committee purposes have become confused with their functions (Capron 
1984). The three basic functions consistently identified as constituting 
the realm of ethics committee activity are (1) case consultation, (2) policy 
development, and (3) education. 
These functions can be separated from the more fundamental purpose 
of ethics committees. Although several authors have argued that the pri-
mary purpose of ethics committees should be protection of patients' in-
terests (President's Commission 1983; Capron 1984; Macklin 1984; 
Veatch 1984; Pellegrino and Thomasma 1988; Cohen 1989; Wikler 
1989), in practice it is not clear that this is, in fact, their purpose. Com-
mittees may have other purposes, not related to patient protection, that 
they do not always openly admit to. For example, they might have a 
more objective goal of assisting patients, family members; additionally, 
health care providers do what is "ethically correct" while balancing the 
interests of the patient, his or her family members, the health care pro-
vider, the institution, and any other interested parties. Ackerman (1989) 
has discussed these two potentially conflicting purposes in his review of 
the role of the ethics consultant. He states that a difficult question is 
whether the consultant "should focus upon assessment of the moral in-
terests of the patient or should embrace an impartial analysis of the com-
peting moral interests of other relevant parties." (1989, 42) 
Other ethics committee purposes might be to manage risk and protect 
the interests of the institution, the physician, and other health care pro-
viders (Robertson 1984). Finally, their guidelines might include a policy 
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goal such as ensuring the fair allocation of scarce medical resources 
within the hospital (Medical Ethics Advisor 1990). 
Some authors have argued that resource allocation and risk manage-
ment are inappropriate purposes for ethics committees, not because 
these goals are unworthy in and of themselves, but because they conflict 
with the goal of patient protection (Veatch 1984). Wolf (1991), for ex-
ample, persuasively argues that there are real dangers in what she calls 
the "double identity" of ethics committees, whereby one minute they 
are advising caregivers and the next, serving patients. She sees these 
conflicting roles as especially problematic for patients because they will 
never know "precisely where they stand" vis-a-vis these committees. 
This duality or multiplicity of purposes creates confusion for ethics 
committees, so that, rather than explicitly setting forth their goals, many 
leave their purposes unstated or intentionally vague. For example, the 
ethics committee at Hennipin County Medical Center considered its 
vagueness a vinue. In response to a survey question by Kushner and 
Gibson, the committee responded: 
We have never formally stated in writing the exact purpose or pur-
poses of our committee but have decided to proceed in an informal 
manner. This was deliberate on our part because we felt that if we be-
came too formal in our stated procedures, there might be negative re-
percussions from the physicians and others in our hospital who have a 
misunderstanding of the function of our committee. We felt that to 
formalize our objectives might be counterproductive to the work of 
our committee. (1984, 100) 
Such vagueness, however, may lead to problems down the road. Further-
more, it also makes it difficult for ethics committees to evaluate their 
own performance. Confirming this difficulty, Fletcher argues that evalu-
ation which "aims to judge the merit or worth of [a) program or activity 
by determining its effects or outcomes" (1989, 173) is not appropriate 
for ethics committees because it assumes that a clear set of goals and pro-
gram objectives had been established. He states that "it would be sur-
prising to find a health care institution in which goals and objectives of 
this activity had been carefully defined from the outset" (173). 
Although at the institutional level members of a committee may be 
confused about its purpose, or may not even have thought about it, 
from a public policy perspective their purpose must be patient protec-
tion. The purpose of safeguarding patients' interests is consistent with 
the government's history of exercising its parens patriae role to protect 
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the vulnerable. Without a doubt, patient protection motivated the gov-
ernment to mandate or encourage the creation of ethics committees, 
with particular emphasis on the issue of withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment for patients who have lost decision-making ca-
pacity (Jaffe 1989). The President's Commission envisioned this issue as 
the primary concern of ethics committees, and it described their duties 
as ensuring "that the interests of all parties, especially those of the inca-
pacitated person, have been adequately represented [and] to promoting 
the well-being of incapacitated patients" {1983, 164). Furthermore, 
public policy norms for resolving cases about treatment of patients are 
based on following the patient's preferences or doing what is in the pa-
tient's best interests. Thus, any effort to evaluate ethics committees from 
a public policy vantage point must begin from the premise that their 
goal is to protect the interests of patients. 
Laying Out a Comprehensive Framework: 
Where to Begin? 
In evaluating a new program or intervention, policy makers, funding or-
ganizations, planners, and administrators typically ask the following 
questions: 
1. Is the program/ intervention reaching the appropriate target popu-
lation? 
2. Is it effective? 
3. How much does it cost? 
4. What are its costs relative to its effectiveness? 
These questions, somewhat modified, form the basis for my proposal 
that ethics committees be evaluated using the criteria of access, quality, 
and cost effectiveness. I argue that these three criteria should be used to 
assess each of the three major functions performed by ethics committees 
from the perspective of their purpose. 
The Criteria: A Justification 
Access 
Fost and Cranford have asserted that "the most controversial question 
confronting an institution considering formation of an ethics committee 
Evaluating Ethics Committees 68 5 
is the definition of access and jurisdiction" (1985, 2690). Access is obvi-
ously important for the function of case consultation because without it 
potential users will not utilize the committees. Thus, we need to know 
whether there are obstacles to the committees' use: Do potential users 
know about the committees? How are they notified about the commit-
tees and gaining access to them? Are the procedures for use uncompli-
cated? Do potential users understand what the committees do? Do they 
think the committees worthwhile? Would they use the committees? If 
not, why not? All of these questions should be asked when evaluating a 
committee from the perspective of case consultation. However, access 
may also be important from the perspective of policy development and 
education. If our goal is to develop policies that are satisfactory to the 
community at large, we may want to invite "outsiders" to participate in 
policy development discussions. Similarly, if we want to educate the hos-
pital staff, or those served by the institution, about ethical issues in pa-
tient care, we must ensure that all relevant staff, as well as patients and 
their family members, have access to the committee's educational activities. 
Quality 
The quality of ethics committees is perhaps the most important evalua-
tive criterion, yet it is probably the most elusive to define and apply. In 
defining quality, I borrow from the framework proposed by Donabedian 
(1980). His three components-structure, process, and outcome-have 
been generally accepted as the starting point for thinking about the eval-
uation of health care quality. 
In the health care setting, structure includes the tools or resources put 
into the care provided: the physical plant or facility, the individuals who 
provide the care and their qualifications, and the equipment or hard-
ware utilized. The structure of ethics committees would largely comprise 
the individuals serving on them: their qualifications and expertise. 
Donabedian uses the term "process" to refer to the interaction be-
tween the health care provider and the patient: what the provider says, 
how she arrives at a diagnosis, what tests she administers, what drugs she 
prescribes, and so forth. In the context of ethics committees, process 
would include due process issues as well as the exchanges between com-
mittee members in the consultations and committee meetings. 
In evaluating health care services, outcome generally means the health 
status of the patient: on some objective scale, did the patient's health 
improve? Donabedian includes not only the physical and physiological 
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aspects of health, but also the social and psychological factors. Further-
more, he extends the definition to encompass patient attitudes, that is, 
some measure of the patient's satisfaction with the care he or she re-
ceived. Thus, his measure of outcome includes both subjective and ob-
jective criteria. In the context of ethics committees, other than criteria 
based on user satisfaction, it is not clear what the appropriate outcome 
criteria would be. Is there some yardstick of "ethical rightness" that we 
can consult? 
In assessing the quality of health care provided, Donabedian and 
other evaluation experts (Jonas 1977} assert that process and outcome are 
our greatest concern. Although, historically, structure has been the basis 
for evaluating the quality of health care, academics have criticized this 
criterion as ineffective and as not clearly leading to good outcomes. 
Structural indicators alone often cannot be relied upon as adequate mea-
sures of good quality care. 
There is also considerable debate in the evaluation literature regard-
ing how much relative weight should be given to process versus outcome 
measures. Process as a basis for evaluation assumes that good process 
leads to good outcomes, whereas outcome measures assume that good re-
sults are directly related to good care. Obviously, there are exceptions to 
these assumptions. A patient can improve in spite of poor treatment and 
can deteriorate in spite of the best medical treatment. 
I will address the limitations and potential for using each of these 
approaches-structure, process, and outcome-to assess the quality of 
ethics committees. 
Cost Effectiveness 
Some have suggested that we examine the cost effectiveness of ethics 
committees when we are evaluating them. Others have argued that such 
a criterion is inappropriate because our concern should be the quality of 
the committees' ethical deliberations and advice, not their cost, a view 
that I regard as naive and unrealistic. If we view cost broadly as including 
the value of time, the cost of using ethics committees will be important 
to health care providers, patients, and their surrogates. Their budget and 
personnel costs will also be important to institutions that provide re-
sources to the committee. As Povar states: 
Ethics committees often demand substantial time commitments from 
participants, and to be effective, real financial commitments from ad-
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m1mstrators. It is likely that these people will demand evidence of 
success, including defensible outcomes, in return for their invest-
ments of time and money. (1991, 907} 
Similarly, cost effectiveness as a basis for evaluation is likely to be of 
concern to public policy makers, who may be confronted with proposed 
legislation that would mandate ethics committees, or who are trying to 
determine how to allocate scarce federal or state dollars. Although no 
legislature is currently funding institutional ethics committees, cost ef-
fectiveness would be a likely criterion if funding or reimbursement of 
committee consultations were to be considered by a legislature or by the 
Health Care Financing Administration under Medicare. 
Evaluators will want to know how the costs and achievements of ethics 
committees compare with alternatives like individual ethics consultants, 
the hospital legal counsel, the hospital chaplain, a psychologist or coun-
selor, or a court. 
Applying the Criteria to a 
Selected Function 
To demonstrate the applicability of the framework, this section of the ar-
ticle applies the proposed criteria to the function of case consultation. To 
the extent possible, existing data are utilized in the evaluation process. 
Much of the data for this section is based on the following sources: a 
study of hospital ethics committees that I conducted in Maryland, the 
District of Columbia, and Virginia (Hoffmann 1991}; the work of the 
Minnesota Ethics Committee Network (1990}; research by D'Oronzio, 
Dunn, and Gregory (1991} in New Jersey; a study by La Puma et al. 
(1992} on bioethics consultants in Illinois; and research by Youngner et 
al. (1984} on patient attitudes toward ethics committees at a Cleveland 
Hospital. 
Although I will try to adhere to the proposed framework, its applica-
tion raises fundamental questions about ethics committees and high-
lights areas that require more data and empirical work. The framework 
also reveals the limitations and difficulties of using some of the identi-
fied criteria. 
Access 
If a committee's goal is to protect the interests of patients, the commit-
tee must ensure that patients or their surrogates have access to the com-
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mittee. Although my study of hospital ethics committees in Maryland, 
the District of Columbia, and Virginia (Hoffmann 1991) showed that 
patients and their family members are infrequent users of the commit-
tees, the study did not assess whether patients or their families knew 
about the committees or their function. However, the study by 
Youngner et al. (1984) of patient attitudes toward ethics committees at 
one hospital found that only 8 percent of the patients questioned knew 
that the hospital had an ethics committee. Of those 8 percent, none cor-
rectly perceived the committee's actual function. Although ten years 
have passed since that study was conducted, it is unlikely that the level 
of patient awareness of these committees has changed perceptibly. Most 
hospitals have not established any formal mechanism for notifying pa-
tients and family members of their existence (Nash, Leinbach, and 
Fought 1989). Funhermore, the general media have not carried much 
information about them. 
Access by patients and their family members to ethics committees de-
pends in large pan on their health care providers' awareness of the com-
mittees and whether they elect to inform patients and their families 
about them. The Maryland Study (Hoffmann 1991) addressed this ques-
tion directly. Health care providers (attending physicians, residents, 
nurses, and social workers) at five Maryland hospitals with long-standing 
committees were asked whether their hospital had an ethics committee. 
Approximately 35 percent of respondents said that they did not know 
whether their hospital had such a committee. Attending physicians were 
somewhat less likely to know than the other groups surveyed. Because 
health care providers exen so much control over their patients and their 
access to ethics committees, it is important that both health care provid-
ers and patients be informed about the existence of the committees and 
their ability to utilize them. 
An evaluation of access must also consider whether there are any ob-
stacles to use of the committees by patients and their family members. 
For example: Do patients or family members understand the role of the 
committees? Are they intimidated by the thought of using a committee 
for such personal matters as withdrawal of life suppon? A thorough eval-
uation would solicit this information from hospital patients and their 
families. 
Another question that should be asked with respect to access is 
whether the committees are acting to protect patients when patients can-
not speak for themselves and either have no family members or have 
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family members who will not request help from the committee. Lo (1987) 
points out that "people who need the most help in expressing their pref-
erences or interests may be the least likely to request a meeting. They 
may be cognitively impaired or unable to navigate the medical system or 
there may be cultural, language or educational barriers" (47). 
Ethics committees have generally been reactive in their case review. If 
they are to protect patients, they must take a more proactive stance in 
some cases. Cenainly, patient representatives and ombudsmen should 
be informed about the committees and should have access to them, 
which means that they must be told of the committees' existence and 
purpose and apprised of their right to utilize them when they believe 
patients' interests are not being served. 
Quality 
Structure. In assessing the quality of case consultation services pro-
vided by an ethics committee from the perspective of protecting the pa-
tient's interests, structurally we will want to ensure that the committee 
includes members who will serve the interests of patients and their repre-
sentatives. Most committees are heavily dominated by health care profes-
sionals (Minnesota Ethics Committee Network 1990; Hoffmann 1991; 
D'Oronzio, Dunn, and Gregory 1991), and it is questionable whether 
they will adhere consistently to the goal of safeguarding the patient's in-
terests. Although these individuals will often put the patient's interests 
foremost, they also may carry to the table the biases of the medical pro-
fession, and they may assess the risks and benefits associated with a par-
ticular treatment differently than a patient would. They may also feel an 
obligation to protect their fellow professionals and the hospital from lia-
bility, or perhaps they may believe that they have a duty to contain costs 
or to preserve limited health care resources. These valid objectives may 
be at odds, however, with the patient's wishes or best interests. Further-
more, health care providers may not share the values of the patients under 
discussion. If the primary goal of ethics committees is to protect patients' 
interests, a strong argument can be made that committees should be 
more heterogeneous and should include representatives of the commu-
nity such as other patients and individuals who are likely to share the pa-
tients' values. This might mean modifying the committee based on the 
specific patient seeking assistance. For example, a representative of the 
religious denomination of an individual with strong religious beliefs 
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might be brought in to consult with the committee. To make patients 
and their surrogates feel welcome, committees could include individuals 
with a counseling background, like social workers, psychiatrists, clergy, 
or clinical psychologists, who are experienced in dealing with crises and 
grieving. An evaluation should ask whether committees include individ-
uals who have these characteristics. 
Although, along with other authors, I have espoused the criterion of 
heterogeneity in ethics committee composition, admittedly more work 
needs to be done to examine how this structural criterion is related to 
process and outcomes in ethics committee case consultation. Schierton 
(1992) has made some headway here. In a study of 137 hospital ethics 
committees, she found that a multidisciplinary committee does not nec-
essarily ensure committee "success." However, her measure of success-
the number of interventions undertaken by the committees in each 
functional area- is not necessarily consistent with my espoused goal for 
ethics committees: protection of patient interests. 
Process 
At least three models of process might be appropriate for ethics commit-
tee consultations. The first two, described at length by Wolf (1991), are 
(1) an adjudicatory model, in which the committee hears from the rele-
vant parties and makes a recommendation, much like a judge or arbitra-
tor, and (2) a consultation model, which is analogous to the medical 
consultation practice of medical staff consulting with other medical pro-
fessionals about the treatment of a specific patient. In the consultation 
model, a patient may not be notified of the consult. A third model, me-
diation, may be appropriate in some cases, especially where dispute reso-
lution is required. As described by Gibson and West (1991), the 
committee in this model would act as a facilitator or mediator, conven-
ing all the relevant parties and assisting them to arrive at a mutually 
agreeable solution. 
When the goal of the committees is patient protection, the consulta-
tion model is problematic. Wolf (1991) has attacked this model as dan-
gerous for patients, as it affords them no notice or other due process 
protections. 
For incompetent patients, the adjudicatory model, in most cases, 
should provide the greatest patient protection. In establishing standards 
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for the adjudicatory model, it is important to distinguish between the 
type of procedure associated with due process, which is generally external 
to the deliberative process of a decision-making body (i.e., notice and an 
opportunity to be heard), and the internal workings of the body (i.e., 
how it arrives at a decision). Wolf (1991) argues convincingly that if we 
are concerned with protecting patients' interests, ethics committees must 
incorporate elements of procedural due process in their operations. She 
specifically advocates that committees notify a patient or surrogate about 
any case consultation involving that patient and state the process the 
committee will use and how the patient or surrogate may participate in 
it; that the patient or surrogate be permitted to bring to the consultation 
anyone he or she wishes, including a physician, lawyer, clergy, or ethi-
cist; that the patient or surrogate be given an opportunity to participate 
in the consultation and to challenge statements made by committee 
members and health care providers; and that the patient receive both a 
written explanation of the recommendation of the committee and an op-
portunity to discuss the recommendation with committee members. 
Wolf persuasively argues that this type of procedure is needed. Al-
though it is debatable whether full-blown due process protections are 
necessary in each case, as there is a valid argument that these procedures 
will make ethics committee case reviews more adversarial than they need 
to be, at a minimum relevant parties should be given notice, an oppor-
tunity to be heard, and an explanation of the recommendation of the 
committee, if one is made. Yet Wolf points out that ethics committees 
are a "due process wasteland"- that "there is no indication that commit-
tees regularly offer patients any of [these basic protections]" (831). 
Any systematic evaluation of ethics committees should seek to deter-
mine to what extent these procedural due process protections are pro-
vided by ethics committees. Although many of these protections are 
intrinsically valid, it would also be helpful to know to what extent they 
actually make a difference in patient outcomes and user satisfaction. 
As to what constitutes appropriate deliberative, internal procedures, it 
seems that there is little consensus. For example, does it matter whether 
the committee discussed, or did not discuss, formal ethical concepts? 
whether they discussed the relevant law? whether they used a process of 
consensus or majority vote to reach a recommendation? Van Allen et al. 
(1989) have asserted that we should consider "meaningful dialogue" as 
one measure of the effectiveness of an ethics committee, but they do not 
offer a definition of meaningful dialogue. Although it is as difficult to 
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arrive at objective criteria for evaluating the internal process of an ethics 
committee, I believe some specific measures should be considered: 
1. Did all relevant parties-health care providers, patient, family-
have an opportunity to speak? 
2. Did members of the committee participate freely in the delibera-
tions, or were the discussions dominated by a few individuals? 
3. Did anyone try to gather facts about the patient's wishes? If the 
goal of the committee is patient protection, evaluators will want to 
ask whether anyone attempted to determine the patient's prefer-
ences: Were any documents that the patient prepared reviewed by 
the committee? Were family members or friends who knew the pa-
tient interviewed? If no family members or friends were available, 
were there interviews with health care providers who knew the pa-
tient's preferences? 
4. If there was no, or insufficient, information available about the pa-
tient's preferences, was any effort made to determine the best in-
terests of the patient? How was this determined? Were the factors 
considered consistent with the literature on this issue? Was each 
member of the committee asked to express an opinion about the 
patient's best interest? Were committee members whose values 
were similar to the patient heard from? 
5. Did the committee have the relevant medical and legal informa-
tion as well as the ethical input it needed? This question raises 
another one: Who is to decide what is relevant? Such evaluation 
arguably requires that an independent group with expertise in these 
areas evaluate the committee's deliberations, either by unobtru-
sively sitting in on committee deliberations, by observing video- or 
audiotapes, or by reviewing notes, if any, of the consultations. 
Hospitals have resorted to peer review to evaluate the care given by 
health care providers. A similar concept could be applied to ethics 
committees. A specially trained, interdisciplinary team consisting 
of a bioethicist, a physician, and an attorney could evaluate this as-
pect of the committee's process. 
6. Did the committee use a process designed to reach consensus and 
vote on the appropriate outcome, or did it simply leave the recom-
mendation up to the chair or a smaller group? The Maryland Study 
(Hoffmann 1991) found that most committees attempt to reach a 
consensus. I am aware of a few committees that make no effort to 
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seek a consensus, but instead just outline, from an ethical perspec-
tive, the various options open to the parties and their pros and 
cons. Moreno (1990) and Gregory (1990) argue that the value of 
committee consensus is that it is a representation of the "social in-
telligence" or "common wisdom of the committee," reflecting the 
"moral climate and direction of the institution and perhaps of the 
community at large." 
These criteria are appropriate if a committee has adopted an adjudica-
tory model for case consultation. Regarding the third model, mediation, 
described by Gibson and West (1991), if the purpose of ethics commit-
tees is to protect patient interests, there may be good reason to be skepti-
cal about it as a process for some ethics committee cases. Mediation, for 
example, may not be appropriate if there is no patty who is actually 
speaking for the patient, or if the person speaking for the patient is in-
timidated by the other parties. Safeguards in the mediation context would 
logically include elements of due process, particularly notice of the me-
diation session, information about mediation and panicipating parties' 
rights, a neutral mediator or mediators, and assurance that the voice of 
the patient is being "heard." 
The difficulties in determining standards for the internal workings of 
the ethics committee under an adjudicative model apply to a mediation 
model as well. At a minimum, we would want to know whether all rele-
vant parties were present and had an opponunity to express their inter-
ests and position. We can also ask whether the facilitators were, in fact, 
neutral and not biased or heavy handed: did they provide information 
on relevant ethical principles and law, and did they let the parties reach 
their own agreement or did they impose a decision on them? In addi-
tion, we will want to know how these factors affected the ultimate out-
come of the case. 
Whether a consultative, adjudicatory, or mediation model is selected, 
one component of an evaluation of process will be to ask the patient or 
family member who sought the committee's assistance for his or her eval-
uation of the committee's process. Types of questions might include the 
following: 
• Were the individuals who responded to the request for services sen-
sitive to the concerns of the consulting patient or family members? 
• Did the consult team ask useful questions, clarify issues, and seem 
knowledgeable? 
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• Did the consult clarify ethical issues versus other concerns? 
• Did the patient or family member become aware of additional 
points of view and gain confidence in his or her decision making? 
• Did the committee process help family members to determine what 
the patient would have wanted? 
A questionnaire might also include more practical questions about 
promptness of the committee response and ease of contacting the consult 
team. 
Although I would argue that these criteria are important measures of 
committee process, requiring them as the standard for evaluating ethics 
committees calls for additional empirical study of how these process mea-
sures in fact relate to outcomes. 
Outcome 
An evaluation of outcome may also include both subjective and objec-
tive measures. Some have relied exclusively on subjective measures. For 
example, La Puma et al. (1992) relied solely on the perceptions of physi-
cian users in analyzing the effectiveness of an ethics consultant. From the 
perspective of protecting patient interests, however, it would be most 
important to ask the patients or their surrogate whether they were satisfied 
with the outcomes. In many cases, the patient will lack decision-making 
capacity. Evaluators can then ask the patient's family members or surro-
gates who participated in the consultation whether they were satisfied 
with the committee recommendation. 
Although assessing user satisfaction is imponant, relying on subjective 
measures alone is insufficient. As Tulsky and Lo (1992) argued in a 
critique of La Puma's study, in addition to data on user satisfaction it 
would be helpful "to evaluate ... objective measures of dilemma resolu-
tion." The difficulty comes in determining what those objective criteria 
should be. If there is any evidence of the patient's wishes, evaluators will 
want to compare that to the final outcome. However, if there is no such 
evidence, the appropriate criteria for evaluation, if any, are controversial. 
When there is no evidence of patient wishes, evaluators must deter-
mine whether a committee's recommendation was in the patient's best 
interest. This is the appropriate standard from both a legal and ethical 
perspective. Given the epistemological problems inherent in knowing 
what is best for a patient who is unconscious or incompetent to make his 
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or her own medical decisions, however, there is reason to doubt the 
capacity of any reviewers to be sure of the correctness of a given decision. 
As some philosophers have pointed out, in many cases either terminat-
ing or continuing life support for a patient will be ethically appropriate. 
As a result, we cannot and should not expect ethics committees to come 
up with a "best answer," only one that is ethically and socially accept-
able. To determine whether the recommendation was within the bounds 
of what is ethically or socially acceptable, we would have to resort to re-
view of the recommendation by a trained bioethicist (for ethical "right-
ness") or by a panel of citizens thought to have values similar to those of 
the patient, who, much like a jury, would determine whether the recom-
mendation was socially appropriate. 
Finally, evaluators must try to assure that ethics committee recom-
mendations are being applied consistently and without bias. Therefore, 
from a policy perspective, evaluators will want to ensure that there is no 
statistically significant difference in ethics committee recommendations 
for certain vulnerable groups, or for groups that have been traditionally 
disadvantaged: minorities, women, the poor, the homeless, or individ-
uals without family members. A discovery that committees in the aggre-
gate were treating these groups differently from others- terminating 
their life supports more frequently or overtreating them more often-
would raise troubling questions about the fairness of ethics committee 
recommendations. 
Again, in considering outcome, it is important to look not only at the 
ethics committee's recommendation, but also at the ultimate patient 
outcome, and to consider whether it was consistent with the committee's 
recommendation. Committees whose recommendations are not followed 
will have little impact on protecting patients' interests. 
Cost Effectiveness 
The costs of case consultation by ethics committees will probably fall on 
three groups: the individual committee participants, those who use the 
committee (both health care providers and patients and their families), 
and the institution that the committee serves. From the perspective of 
the committee members who are not hospital employees, the costs to 
them of being on the committee will be their opportunity costs. For 
most physicians, the costs will comprise income (in kind or in cash) they 
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would receive through alternative uses of their time (i.e., seeing pa-
tients, consulting, or teaching). 
The hospital administration will incur such direct costs as those for 
providing staff support and education programs for committee mem-
bers, including speakers, videos, written materials, and conference atten-
dance; the hospital will also assume the indirect costs of finding other 
employees to fill in for committee members while they are engaged in 
case consultation activities. For example, it may be necessary to find an-
other nurse to replace one who is attending a case consultation meeting, 
especially if she cares for patients directly. If she is an administrative 
nurse, attendance at these meetings may be part of her job. Meetings 
held when a nurse member is not "on duty" will cost the institution 
nothing and will figure as opportunity costs to the nurse. 
The cost to users of the committee should also be considered. Physi-
cians, who are the predominant users of these committees, encounter 
costs that are similar to those of physician members: their opportunity 
costs, defined as what else they could be doing during the time they are 
consulting with the ethics committee. 
The costs to family members who use the committee must also be 
counted. These will include any direct or indirect costs they may incur, 
such as taking time off from work, traveling to the hospital (from in or 
out of town), hiring a babysitter, as well as their opportunity costs. 
Also significant to families will be their emotional costs. One shon-
coming of cost-effectiveness analysis, however, is that it may not ade-
quately account for these types of costs. Yet, when compared with some 
alternatives, such as the courts, on the measure of emotional price ethics 
committees may be much less costly. 
The costs of hospital ethics committees appear to fall primarily on in-
dividual members and users who are not hospital employees. The costs 
to hospitals themselves are relatively low. I mentioned earlier that al-
though there is currently no governmental funding of ethics committees, 
if public funding were to be considered, the level of funding at issue 
would be balanced against the effectiveness of the committee and com-
pared with the costs of alternative programs that might achieve the same 
results. 
The real challenge in applying cost-effectiveness analysis to ethics 
committees, however, lies in determining the appropriate units of effec-
tiveness by which to assess them. Although I have discussed the diffi-
culty of setting outcome standards for measuring the quality of ethics 
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committees, I will try here to suggest concrete measures of effectiveness. 
If our purpose is to protect patients' interests, cost effectiveness might be 
measured by researching a year's worth of cases considered by a hospital 
ethics committee and asking these questions: 
1. What percentage of case decisions were consistent with the pa-
tient's preferences or the patient's best interest? 
2. In what percentage of cases were surrogates satisfied with the pro-
cess used and/or the recommendation made? 
3. What was the cost to all of the relevant parties for bringing all 
these cases to the committee? 
In order to conduct an actual cost-effectiveness analysis, each of these 
questions should also be asked regarding alternative mechanisms for 
dealing with these cases. Among these might be bringing the cases to a 
single bioethics consultant, to the hospital chaplain, or to a member of 
the clergy; going to coun; or adhering to the status quo, that is, dealing 
on a "catch-as-catch-can" basis with individual health care providers. 
Two outcomes for each alternative would be obtained. One outcome 
would be a result of patient-based measures, that is, patient preferences 
and patient interests; the other, a result of surrogate satisfaction. We 
might find that ethics committees are more cost effective than the alter-
natives on neither, one, or both criteria. 
Conclusion 
The time has arrived for serious and formal evaluation of ethics commit-
tees. The old excuses- that the committees are in their infancy and that 
more time is needed to experiment with different approaches are no lon-
ger valid (see Wolf 1991). It is time to assess the experimentation results. 
Public policy makers cannot continue to push legislation mandating or 
advocating the establishment of these committees without examining 
them more critically. The limited data available raise concerns about the 
performance of ethics committees, at least from the perspective that 
their purpose is to protect patients' interests. In large part, these con-
cerns can be attributed to the committees' lack of clear purpose or to 
their multiple and conflicting goals. In their desire to persuade health 
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care providers to use them, some ethics committees seem to soften their 
"patient advocacy position," adopting instead a more objective stance 
that balances the interests of all relevant parties, including the institu-
tion. Due process provisions have not been implemented in many cases 
because committees do not necessarily see patient interests as their pri-
mary responsibility; they continue to function informally, using the ad 
hoc medical consultation process most committee members, as health 
care professionals, are comfortable with. 
Yet, based on the scanty data available, committees cannot be con-
demned. Although they might not meet the public policy goal of pro-
tecting patient interests sufficiently to warrant legislation mandating 
their establishment or encouraging their use, they may be filling an im-
portant role from the perspective of health care institutions. We must 
conduct more research and gather more data before arriving at any gen-
eralizable conclusions. In this article I have sought to assist public offi-
cials and policy makers who wish to evaluate ethics committees by 
providing a framework and suggesting criteria for evaluation. I have also 
attempted to apply the criteria and to point out the conceptual and 
practical limitations of certain measures. Access is perhaps the "clearest" 
and most easily measurable of the evaluation criteria, yet empirical data 
on access are deficient. Quality must be considered, but certain aspects 
of quality will be nearly impossible to measure. Structure seems to be 
the simplest measure of quality for an ethics committee, just as it is for 
measuring the quality of health care. Yet, more empirical studies are 
necessary to determine what types of structural standards produce good 
process and outcomes. Process can be broken down into types of mea-
sures based on due process and those stemming from the internal delib-
erations of the committee. We need more work on what these measures 
should be, but I have set forth some minimal process criteria. In measur-
ing outcome, user satisfaction and consistency with patient preference 
are appropriate for some decisions. Other outcome measures remain elu-
sive, especially for the application of a best interest test. 
We also need to begin to assess processes and outcomes of ethics com-
mittees and the relation between the two. Research on the dynamics of 
ethics committees and their recommendations will be a great service to 
the health care community. 
Finally, cost effectiveness is both a valid and an important criterion 
for evaluating ethics committee performance. Some effort to assess the 
costs and benefits of these committees, compared with the other relevant 
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alternatives for dealing with ethical dilemmas and patient provider con-
flict, is warranted. 
As the President's Commission pointed out in its 1982 repon on mak-
ing health care decisions, "Very little is known ... about the actual ef-
fectiveness of institutional ethics committees, especially in comparison 
with private, informal mechanisms or with judicial decision-making for 
patients lacking decision-making capacity" (187). The comment is still 
relevant over a decade later. Some efforts on this front are sorely needed. 
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